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NOTES
LIMITED APPEARANCES AND ISSUE PRECLUSION:
RESETTING THE TRAP?
Section 75(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments' pro-
vides that when a court renders judgment in a quasi in rem
action, determinations of issues actually litigated shall have preclu-
sive effect in subsequent suits between the parties. Comment d
suggests that when a litigant defends on the merits in a limited
appearance, he may be precluded from relitigating issues3 in a
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75(c) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) [§ 32]
[Throughout this Note, the corresponding section numbers that will appear in the final
Restatement Second are given in brackets after citation to the tentative drafts.] states:
A valid and final judgment begun by attachment, garnishment, or similar
process (traditionally described as "quasi in rem") in which jurisdiction is exer-
dsed only with respect to the thing proceeded against and in which the plaintiff
seeks not to determine the existence of interests in the thing but rather to
apply the thing to the satisfaction of a claim against the defendant:
(c) Is conclusive between the parties, in accordance with the rules of
issue preclusion, as to any issues actually litigated by them and deter-
mined in the action.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980)
[§ 32]. A "limited appearance" is a defendant's appearance in court to contest a quasi in
rem dalm on the merits without submitting to the court's general personal jurisdiction. In
jurisdictions permitting the practice, see note 10 infra, the defendant's potential liability will
not exceed the value of the attached property. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 40
(1942). A "limited appearance" is distinguishable from a "special appearance," in which a
defendant challenges a court's personal or subject matter jurisdiction over him, without
submitting to the court's jurisdiction through his appearance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
oF JUDGMENTS § 11, Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 8]; Note, Limited Appearances,
7 UTAH L. REv. 369 (1961).
' Issue preclusion operates to preclude relitigation of particular issues that were
actually litigated and determined in a prior action, and the determination of which was
essential to the previously rendered judgment. The Restatement Second states the rule:
"When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclu-
sive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [§ 27].
For example, suppose driver A sues driver B in tort, alleging that B drove negligently
and caused a crash in which A sustained personal injuries. B raises the defense that A was
contributorily negligent. The jurisdiction recognizes contributory negligence as a total bar
to recovery. After hearing the merits of the case, the jury returns a verdict for A. If B
subsequently sues A to recover for damage to B's car arising from the same accident, A
may invoke issue preclusion to prevent B from relitigating the question of A's negligence;
the verdict for A in the first suit necessarily meant that A was found not negligent.
595
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subsequent suit.4  If the basis for preclusion is the defendant's
limited appearance in a prior quasi in rem action, however, the
policies of res judicata do not support application of the Restate-
ment's rule.' Moreover, preclusion may run afoul of the due pro-
cess clause of the Constitution.'
THE RATIONALE FOR LIMITED APPEARANCES
When a plaintiff commences a quasi in rem action I by
attaching the defendant's property, the defendant faces a di-
lemma. He may either default and forfeit the seized property, or
appear in court to defend the underlying claim on the merits,
thereby submitting to the court's general personal jurisdiction and
risking potentially unlimited liability.' To alleviate the harshness
4 Comments accompanying section 75 state that "[ilt is not necessary to allow [the
defendant] the ... benefit of relitigating issues he has chosen to litigate in the initial pro-
ceeding." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1980) [§ 32]. Section 75(c) arguably applies when the defendant makes a limited appear-
ance in an initial action. Courts unquestionably would construe any other type of appear-
ance by the defendant to argue the claim's merits as a general appearance exposing the
defendant to unlimited potential liability in personam. See 2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
12.13 (2d ed. 1980). In such circumstances, the rules of bar and merger for personal
judgments would determine res judicata effects. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 75, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) [§ 32]; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 48, 48.1
(1942).
s See, e.g., Cleary, ResJudicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 344 (1948); Polasky, Col-
lateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IOWA L. REv. 217, 219-22 (1954); Developments
in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 827 (1952); Note, Collateral Estoppel By
Judgment, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 647, 648-49 (1952). See notes 18-21 and accompanying text
infra.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; notes 32-47 and accompanying text infra.
In Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886), the Supreme Court emphasized that
the scope of quasi in rem actions is limited: "[A]ctions quasi in rem, ... though brought
against persons, . .. only seek to subject certain property of those persons to the discharge
of the claims asserted." Id. at 187. In such actions, the Court stated, "the judgment ...
binds only the parties in their relation to the property." Id. at 190.
' Although a court exercising quasi in rem jurisdiction generally has power to render
judgment only for the amount of the attached property's value, a defendant, by making a
general appearance, may give the court complete power over his person. This converts the
quasi in rem action to one in which a resulting judgment can reach all of the defendant's
assets. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1980) [§ 32]; see, e.g., United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 968 (1957); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 58 F.R.D. 469 (D. Del. 1973); Campbell v.
Murdock, 90 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Ohio 1950); Bede Steam Shipping Co. v. New York Trust
Co., 54 F.2d 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 117 A.2d 365 (1955).
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of this dilemma,9 various jurisdictions "0 permit the defendant to
make a limited appearance, which protects him from a personal
judgment while he defends the quasi in rem action on the
merits. "
These jurisdictions justify limited appearances on several
grounds. First, a court that otherwise has no power over a defen-
dant's person should not suddenly arrogate such power merely
because the defendant seeks to protect his property from a poten-
tially unfounded and frivolous claim.'2 Second, the fortuity of
owning property in a possibly distant state should not force a
defendant to choose between forfeiting the property through de-
fault or submitting personally to the court's jurisdiction and risk-
ing an in personam judgment against him that may far exceed the
value of the attached property. 3  Finally, basic notions of due
process and fairness suggest that if the defendant chooses to liti-
gate, his risk should not be disproportionate to the power the
court has over him through his attached property.
4
9 One commentator suggests that "an attempt to force defendant to choose between
abandonment of his property without defense and submission to the jurisdiction of the
court for all purposes contravenes the constitutional guarantee of due process of law."
Taintor, Foreign Judgment In Rem: Full Faith and Credit v. Res Judicata In Personam, 8 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 223, 226 (1942). See also Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn.
1973); Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 950-53 (1960).
But see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 40, Comment a (1942) (state's refusal to allow lim-
ited appearance not violative of constitutional due process).
1" See, e.g., McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Simmons v. Cowper, 233 La. 397, 96 So. 2d 646 (1957); Miller
Bros. Co. v. State, 201 Md. 535, 95 A.2d 286 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 347 U.S. 340
(1954); Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916); Osborne v. White
Eagle Oil Co., 355 P.2d 1041 (Okla. 1960).
" See, e.g., Dry Clime Lamp Corp. v. Edwards, 389 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1968) (prohibit-
ing in personam judgment against litigating nonresident defendant except as affecting in-
terest in seized property); Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 F.
214 (6th Cir. 1922) (defendant's participation in trial on merits not effecting general
appearance or altering in rem nature of actions); Miller Bros. Co. v. State, 201 Md. 535,
547, 95 A.2d 286, 291-92 (1953) ("a defendant whose property has been attached ...
[may] appear in the action solely for the purpose of protecting his property and without
subjecting himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court, even though in order to
protect his property he contests the validity of the plaintiff's claim"), rev'd on other grounds,
347 U.S. 340 (1954); Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916).
2 See, e.g., McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940) (jurisdiction over stockholder claims against company limited to
actions in rem); Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire and Rubber Co., 285 F. 214 (6th
Cir. 1922); Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916).
's See, e.g., Dry Clime Lamp Corp. v. Edwards, 389 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1968); Miller
Bros. Co. v. State, 201 Md. 535, 95 A.2d 286 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 347 U.S. 340
(1954).
,4 See Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973).
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II
THE APPLICABILITY OF ISSUE PRECLUSION
TO ISSUES ADJUDICATED IN LIMITED APPEARANCES
Section 75(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments', gener-
ally would preclude relitigation of issues previously litigated and
determined in a quasi in rem action,16 even if the defendant made
a limited appearance and his potential liability was limited to the
value of the attached property. Application of the general rule
of issue preclusion in this situation contravenes the policies of res
judicata and may suffer constitutional infirmities.
A. Conservation of Judicial Resources
The doctrine of issue preclusion is designed to conserve judi-
cial resources." Application of issue preclusion to issues litigated
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75(c) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) [§ 32].
IS The Restatement Second recognizes that particular circumstances may justify excep-
tions to issue preclusion. Section 68.1(e) [§ 28], for example, authorizes relitigation of an
issue when 1) the public interest requires; 2) the significance of an issue in subsequent
actions was unforeseeable in the first action; or 3) the defendant did not have an adequate
opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action. See id. at
§ 68.1 [§ 28]. Although this section arguably protects defendants making limited appear-
ances from collateral estoppel, courts may decide otherwise.
Moreover, it is anomalous to impose on the defendant making a limited appearance
the burden of persuading courts in later actions that he falls within the "insufficient incen-
tive" exception to the rule of preclusion. See id. § 68.1(e)(iii) [§ 28]. This effectively makes
the limited appearance option itself conditional on the defendant's ability to persuade a
later court that he did not have the incentive to litigate fully the initial quasi in rem action.
See note 24 infra. In such circumstances, the defendant is uncertain about the risk of
appearing in the initial suit, and thus about his appropriate defense strategy. Non-
availability of issue preclusion should be the rule, not the exception, for cases involving
limited appearances.
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75(c), Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1980) [§ 32].
"8 Courts are struggling with increasing docket congestion. From 1960 to 1978, the
backlog of pending cases in the United States district courts increased 171.8%. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORTS 177 (1978). The broad doctrine of res judicata, including bar,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973), merger, id. § 47,
and issue preclusion, id. § 68, seeks to prevent wasteful and repetitious litigation. See, e.g.,
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (res judicata protects adversaries from
expense and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and reduces fre-
quency of inconsistent judgments); Wilson v. United States, 166 F.2d 527, 529 (8th Cir.
1948); note 5 supra. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.2-.3 at
529-33 (2d ed. 1977). Because courts have only limited resources with which to handle
growing caseloads, the orderly administration of justice requires that issues previously liti-
gated in a full and fair hearing on the merits not be litigated again.
In Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94
(1939), aff'd on rehearing, 195 So. 322 (Miss. 1940), the plaintiff-creditor brought a quasi
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in a limited appearance, however, may encourage protracted
litigation.'9 The foresighted defendant, with one eye upon the
quasi in rem suit in progress and the other on possible future in
personam suits, will litigate more extensively than the limited
value of the property at stake in the quasi in rem action warrants,
aware that every issue in the initial suit could bind him in a subse-
quent action.2" If the parties never engage in related litigation
in rem action in Louisiana to enforce a chattel mortgage on a dredge that the defendant
had purchased from him. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dis-
miss for want of jurisdiction. After hearing the merits of the case, the trial court ordered
the machine sold and entered a personal judgment against the defendant. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed part of the judgment, but reversed the personal
judgment on the ground that the lower court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant.
The appellate court effectively treated the defendant's initial appearance as a limited
appearance. In a subsequent in personam suit in Mississippi to recover the balance of the
purchase price of the dredge, the plaintiff-creditor argued that the defendant was es-
stopped from invoking defenses that had proved unsuccessful in the Louisiana foreclosure
action. The court found that because the second suit reflected "no difference in quality,
person, or cause of action," rehearing the defendant's defense would have repeated need-
lessly the first action's proceedings. Id. at 96, 191 So. at 99.
It is unclear whether the Mississippi court intended to treat the defendant's appear-
ance in the first suit as a limited appearance. The Louisiana Supreme Court had affirmed
only the in rem portion of the judgment against the defendant. Nevertheless, the Mississip-
pi court noted that the defendant "did not in the trial or appellate courts of Louisiana rest
its defense upon the want of jurisdiction to enter a personal decree against it...." Id. at
93, 191 So. at 97.
One commentator has argued that the desire to save judicial resources does not by
itself justify applying the doctrine of res judicata. See Cleary, supra note 5, at 348. In his
view, "[c]ourts exist for the purpose of trying lawsuits. If the courts are too busy to decide
cases fairly and on the merits, something is wrong." Id.
9 This Note focuses on the impropriety of allowing issue preclusion against a limited
appearance defendant in subsequent actions. Different considerations may be relevant,
however, when the issue is whether issue preclusion should apply against the plaintiff after
a defendant's limited appearance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
75, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) [§ 32]. The fact that the plaintiff chooses the
forum and presumably pursues his claim fully, supports binding him in subsequent suits on
issues previously litigated in a suit where defendant made a limited appearance. Because
courts generally have abandoned the requirement of mutuality of estoppel, binding the
plaintiff but not the limited appearance defendant in subsequent suits probably poses no
problem. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Federal Say. and
Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1973); Note, Mutuality of Estoppel and the
Seventh Amendment: The Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 1002 (1979). But see
Daigneau v. National Cash Register Co., 247 So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Arm-
strong v. Miller, 200 N.W.2d 282 (N.D. 1972).
'0 In Garraway v. Retail Credit Co., 244 Miss. 376, 141 So. 2d 727 (1962), the court
considered the permissibility of giving preclusive effect to a prior determination on the
issue of whether the defendant exhibited malice and bad faith in the preparation of mer-
cantile credit reports. In the plaintiffs prior equitable action to compel documentary dis-
covery, the court held that because the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant
issued the disputed reports with malice and in bad faith, the reports were privileged and
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again, the additional expenditure of judicial resources will have
been completely unnecessary. At best, the application of issue pre-
clusion in this context only shifts the burden of litigation to the
court that hears the initial suit; at worst, it creates wasteful
litigation."
B. Fairness
The Restatement Second observes that a defendant who has
once "had his full day in court" does not deserve another hearing
on issues that he already litigated.2 This rationale derives in part
nondiscoverable. See Retail Credit Co. v. Garraway, 240 Miss. 230, 126 So. 2d 271 (1961).
In the plaintiffs subsequent libel action against the same defendant, the Mississippi appel-
late court concluded that the plaintiff could relitigate the issue of malice and bad faith.
The court stated that "[aipplication of collateral estoppel to a prior action seeking purely
discovery in equity would in the future have the coercive effect of forcing litigants to
full-scaled effort over minor disputes ... , and would act to increase rather than contract
the extent of litigation." 244 Miss. at 386, 141 So. 2d at 731. See also Note, supra note 5, at
650.
2 For example, suppose plaintiff P brings an action against a non-resident defendant
D, seeking $100,000 damages for breach of contract. P cannot secure in personamjurisdic-
tion over D, but succeeds in obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction (despite recent limitations
on quasi in rem jurisdiction, discussed in note 40 infra) by attaching D's in-state property.
D elects to make a limited appearance so that his potential liability will not exceed the
value of the attached property.
If the attached property is a yacht worth $35,000, D may defend vigorously. In such a
case, the possibility of later issue preclusion pursuant to § 75(c) [§ 32] arguably would not
affect D's litigation strategy. If, however, the attached property is a rowboat worth only
$800, the possibility of issue preclusion on the issue of liability may compel D to either (1)
default, in which case the absence of "actual litigation" will render issue preclusion inap-
plicable, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1977) [§ 27], or (2) defend zealously, as if his interests at stake were substantial. If D
defends vigorously and a subsequent suit arises in which P invokes issue preclusion, the
latter court will expend less resources in adjudicating the claim. Nevertheless, because the
earlier court bore the substantial burden of D's precautionary litigation, there probably will
be no net savings of judicial resources. Alternatively, if D defends vigorously and no subse-
quent suit arises, D will have litigated excessively; both D and the court will have expended
time and resources unnecessarily.
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1980) [§ 32] "[I]t is difficult to see why he should be allowed to relitigate an issue as to
which he has had his full day in court. ). In United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298
(2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957), defendants argued that the court could not
constitutionally treat their appearance to protect attached funds as a general appearance
subjecting them to in personam liability. The court disagreed, stating that "[t]he parties
cannot complain of inconvenience, since they have come into the jurisdiction. They have
had their day in court on the issues which would settle both the right to the [attached]
funds and personal liability .. " Id. at 302. See generally Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects
of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. REv. 217 (1954). See also A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/
PRECLUSION V-80 to 81 (1969).
600
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from notions of fairness: a party should not have more than "one
bite of the apple. ' 3
Unfortunately, the facile phrase "had his day in court" begs
the question: is it ever true that a defendant who makes a limited
appearance has had a full and fair day in court? The very essence
of a limited appearance is that it is not full, because the defendant
will litigate the underlying claim only to an extent commensurate
with his interest in the attached property. The purpose of a lim-
ited appearance is to insure that the initial suit will not subject the
defendant to personal liability exceeding the value of seized prop-
erty. Accordingly, a defendant making a limited appearance will
be unlikely to litigate as extensively as he would if his potential
liability were unlimited.2 4  Even though the defendant actually liti-
2' The Restatement and various commentators argue for according broad effect to a
quasi in rem judgment. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75, Comment d
(Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) [§ 32]; 2A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.13 (2d ed. 1980).
Professor Moore states: "[T]he defendant, being willing to come in and litigate this claim in
part so as to protect any interest in the property, should have to let such a defense on the
merits determine the entire personal rights between the parties." Id. 12.13 n.16 (quoting
1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.04 (1938)). However, Professor Moore's assertion that
the defendant is "willing" to litigate in a foreign forum is misleading; typically, the defen-
dant appears reluctantly. Particularly if the property's value warrants protection, the defen-
dant sees no reasonable choice. His compulsion to protect his property interest should not
make his defense on the merits determine the entire personal rights between the parties.
See Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 953 (1960).
214 For discussion of the economics of litigation, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 429-58 (2d ed. 1977). Professor Posner states that "[tihe party optimizes his litigation
expenditures by spending up to the point where a dollar in such expenditures increases
the expected value of the litigation to him by just a dollar." Id. at 445. In allocating re-
sources to litigation, a rational party will take into account the value of his property at
stake and his probability of success in the action. When a limited appearance insures that
the defendant's liability cannot exceed the value of attached property, the defendant is
unlikely to litigate issues as extensively or zealously as he would if his potential liability
could equal the value of all his assets. A limited appearance thus imposes a ceiling on the
defendant's economic interest in the litigation.
Recognition of this phenomenon underlies the principle that collateral estoppel
should not bind parties on litigated issues in unforeseeable subsequent suits. In Evergreens
v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 323 U.S. 720 (1944), the court cautioned that
"[d]efeat in one suit might entail results beyond all calculation by either party; a trivial
controversy might bring utter disaster in its train." Id. at 929 (L. Hand, J.). See also Develop-
ments in the Law-Res Judicata, supra note 5, at 842-43. The Restatement Second includes
unforeseeability as an exception to the general rule of issue preclusion:
[R]elitigation of the issue in a subsequent action ... is not precluded [when] ...
[t]here is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of the issue ...
because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action that
the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(e)(ii) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) [§ 28]. Partic-
ularly where a defendant believes his appearance creates the potential for only limited
liability, the possibility of unfair surprise from issue preclusion in subsequent suits is great.
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gates and the court renders a determination25 on an issue essen-
tial to the judgment, subsequent courts should not preclude re-
litigation because the resolved issue was contested and decided
only in the narrow context of a limited appearance.
C. Finality and Consistency of Judgments
Probably the strongest argument for precluding relitigation
of issues determined in limited appearances is the interest in
promoting finality and consistency of judgments.2 1 Social stability
requires the prompt and final resolution of disputes so that par-
ties may act with confidence that their obligations and rights have
been established permanently.27  Confidence depends on per-
ceived consistency; parties and the general public must rely on
judgments to guide their future conduct. Inconsistent judgments
create confusion for litigants and others seeking to plan transac-
tions. Moreover, public respect for the judicial system suffers
when courts reach conflicting determinations. Issue preclusion
promotes consistency by denying a court in a second suit the
opportunity to make a determination inconsistent with that made
in the initial suit.
Public respect for the judicial system diminishes, however,
when the price for consistency and finality is manifest injustice to
Nevertheless, a defendant making a limited appearance should not be forced to rely upon
the possibility of his successful invocation of this exception to the general rule of issue
preclusion in order to avoid potentially unlimited liability. See also note 16 supra.
25 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [§ 27];
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942).
1 In Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 74, 246 N.E.2d 725, 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d
955, 962 (1969), the New York Court of Appeals called the incidence of inconsistent re-
sults in lawsuits "a blemish on [the] judicial system." See also Hart v. American Airlines,
Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Cleary, supra note 5, at 344; von
Moschzisker, ResJudicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 300 (1929); Developments in the Law-ResJudi-
cata, supra note 5, at 820.
2 See, e.g., von Moschzisker, supra note 26, at 300; Polasky, supra note 5, at 219-20.
28 Res judicata doctrines generally seek to avoid inconsistent judgments. For example,
the Restatement Second provides that when confronted with two inconsistent judgments, a
court in a third action should accord res judicata effect to the latter judgment. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41.2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [§ 15]. But courts
themselves lack discretion to invoke res judicata, and parties must plead the doctrine as an
affirmative defense. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). This suggests that the problem of incon-
sistent judgments is not critical. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41.2, Com-
ment b (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [§ 15]. Nevertheless, the increasing frequency with which
courts allow a nonparty to the initial suit to invoke collateral estoppel in a later action
suggests that courts are becoming more aware of the problem. See, e.g., Hart v. American
Airlines, Inc., 61 Misc. 2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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litigants. Precluding the relitigation of issues determined in a li-
mited appearance may create such injustice. Jurisdictions that au-
thorize limited appearances recognize the unfairness of subjecting
the defendant to in personam liability when jurisdiction rests only
on the presence of the defendant's property in the forum." If a
court later precludes relitigation of issues determined in the first
action, it expands the effect of the first judgment and effectively
destroys the protection of the limited appearance.30 This seems a
particularly cruel trap to set for the defendant who, lured into
defending on the merits by the promise of limited liability, later
finds himself bound by the determination in an in personam ac-
tion. Such judicial double-talk will hardly enhance public respect
for the judicial system."
D. Preclusion and Due Process
The value of the property attached in the initial quasi in rem
action may provide the defendant incentive to litigate the claim
I The Fourth Circuit stated: "[I]t would indeed be an unfair attitude were the federal
courts ... too prone to treat a special appearance as a general appearance." McQuillen v.
National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877, 881. Although the court spoke in terms of a
"special appearance," its holding, which limited jurisdiction in the case to the in rem
claims, recognized the defendant's right to a limited appearance.
Quoting an earlier Massachusetts case, the court in Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes
stated, "'It would be unreasonable to oblige any man living in one state and having effects
in another state, to make himself amenable to the courts of the last state, that he might
defend his property there attached.'" 224 Mass. at 18, 112 N.E. at 502. See also Miller
Bros. Co. v. State, 201 Md. 535, 95 A.2d 286 (1953).
10 Several commentators have addressed this irony. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE &
H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAws: CASES-COMMENTS-QusIONS 738-39 (2d ed. 1975); Carring-
ton, Collateral Estoppel and Foreign Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 381, 384 (1963); von Mehren
and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1139
n.38 (1966). One commentator has stated: "It would seem ... that collateral estoppel
should not be applied when the defendant has put in a limited appearance, for to do so
defeats the purpose behind permitting such an appearance: to confine to the value of the
property the risk that the defendant incurs in protecting it." Developments in the Law-
Res Judicata, supra note 5, at 835 (footnote omitted).
SI For example, a defendant may decide to make a limited appearance to defend his
interest in an $800 rowboat. See note 21 supra. Relying on the shelter of a limited appear-
ance, he conducts the litigation as if only $800 were at stake. Such limited incentive to
litigate fully during the limited apppearance is typical; the property attached frequently is
the defendant's sole contact with the jurisdiction and less valuable than all of the defen-
dant's assets that remain outside the reach of the court's quasi in rem jurisdiction. See note
40 infra. But if the same issues arise in a subsequent in personam suit in which his poten-
tial liability is much greater, D will have a substantially greater interest in obtaining a
favorable determination. He will suffer unfair surprise if collateral estoppel precludes him
from relitigating the issues. He should not in such instance be required to rely upon the
Restatement Second's general issue preclusion exceptions for lack of incentive to litigate, see
note 16 supra, and unforeseeability, see note 24 supra.
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vigorously. 2 Nevertheless, the application of issue preclusion in
any subsequent in personam action may exceed the constitutional
limits of court power and jurisdiction.3
A court's exercise of personal jurisdiction traditionally de-
pended on the court's territorial power.14  The Supreme Court,
however, gradually recognized that considerations of "fair play
and substantial justice" are prerequisites for personal
jurisdiction." In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,36 the Su-
preme Court held that subjecting a defendant not present within
the territory of the forum to an in personam judgment could be
consistent with due process, provided he had contacts with the
forum such that the maintenance of the suit would not be
'2 See note 31 supra. It is, of course, unclear how often attached property will have a
value substantial enough to motivate a limited appearance defendant to litigate fully, but
not so substantial as to suggest the presence of other contacts between the defendant and
the forum sufficient to support in personam jurisdiction. See note 40 infra.
" In Combs v. Combs, 249 Ky. 155, 60 S.W.2d 368 (1933), the defendant (who had
been a plaintiff in a prior out-of-state quasi in rem action) sought to preclude relitigation
of issues against the plaintiff, who had defaulted as defendant in the prior action. The
court declined to accord preclusive effect to the previous determinations, declaring that
"[s]uch adjudications in so far as they affect the personal obligations and rights of the
parties were and are not binding upon plaintiffs herein, nor do they operate as a res
adjudicata in any future action." Id. at 162, 60 S.W.2d at 371.
The plaintiff's prior default made collateral estoppel inappropriate because the dis-
puted issues had not actually been litigated in the previous action. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [§ 27] (preclusion does
not arise from default judgment). Consequently, the case is distinguishable from one in
which the previous defendant had made a limited appearance on the merits. But see R.
CRAMTON, D. CuRRiE & H. KAY, supra note 30, at 738-39.
Nevertheless, the court in Combs appeared to recognize implicitly the close functional
similarity between the direct exercise of in personam personal jurisdiction and the indirect
exercise of personal jurisdiction through issue preclusion in a later action. The court's
denial of preclusion on issues previously decided in another state, moreover, comports with
the view that one state should not give, through collateral estoppel, a sister state's judg-
ment greater effect than the judgment could have had in the state of the rendering court.
But see Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66
CORNELL L. REv. 510, 530 (1981). Arguably, when a court in one jurisdiction intends to
adjudicate a limited appearance defendant's liability only for the value of the attached
property, the conclusiveness of its determinations should not expand subsequently to dic-
tate complete in personam liability in another jurisdiction's courts. See notes 44-47 and
accompanying text infra.
' See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) ("The authority of every tribunal
is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.").
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). See also Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A
Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 600, 601 (1977).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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unfair. 7 In Shaffer v. Heitner,s8 the Court applied the "minimum
contacts" and "fairness" standards for jurisdiction articulated in
International Shoe to quasi in rem actions. 9 Because of the restric-
tions established in Shaffer, courts will likely exercise quasi in rem
jurisdiction less frequently,4" and thereby diminish the importance
of limited appearances.
Shaffer did not, however, sound a death knell for quasi in
rem jurisdiction." The court arguably left open the possibility
that fewer contacts will satisfy the International Shoe minimum con-
tacts standard when a court seeks to exercise quasi in rem juris-
diction than would be necessary for in personam jurisdiction.42
Several courts appear to have adopted this view.4" Thus, if the
s1 Id. at 316. The Court specifically found that the in-state activities of a foreign cor-
poration, including the exhibition of merchandise samples and the solicitation of orders
from prospective buyers, were "systematic and continuous" and thus sufficient to support
in personam jurisdiction over the corporation in a suit to enforce an obligation arising out
of those activities. Id. at 320.
sa 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
I d. at 207-12. The court declared that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." Id.
at 212 (footnote omitted).
40 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11, Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978) [§ 8]. The necessity for courts exercising quasi in rein jurisdiction to comply with the
International Shoe "minimum contacts" and "fairness" standards, see Clermont, Restating Ter-
ritorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (1981),
should diminish the number of suits commenced by the attachment of property wholly
unrelated to the underlying claim. Writing before the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer,
one commentator observed that "the quasi in rem procedure is rarely useful to plaintiffs
except in cases which the defendant ought not to be asked to defend in the forum chosen
by the plaintiff." Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARv. L.
REV. 303, 306 (1962). Those cases presumably will disappear in light of Shaffer, because
such exercise of jurisdiction probably would not satisfy due process requirements.
41 Quasi in rem jurisdiction may still be available to a plaintiff who cannot obtain juris-
diction over defendant's person in any other forum. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977), the Supreme Court noted, "This case does not raise, and we therefore do not
consider, the question whether the presence of a defendant's property in a State is a suffi-
cient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff." Id. at 211
n.37.
42 Such a two-tiered approach would accord with International Shoe, because arguably a
court's exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction can be "reasonable and just, according to our
traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice," 326 U.S. at 320, even when the
same contacts would not make an exercise of in personam jurisdiction fair. See Silberman,
Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 72 (1978). But see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11, Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 8]; Casad, supra
note 33, at 531.
"s See, e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017, 1022-23 (2d Cir.
1978) (recognizing quasi in rem jurisdiction without determining existence of in personam
jurisdiction); Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273, 1274, 1277-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(holding foreign corporation not amenable to in personam jurisdiction but subject to quasi
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requisite contacts for in personam jurisdiction are lacking, Interna-
tional Shoe's due process requirement should preclude any quasi in
rem judgment from determining the defendant's total in perso-
nam liability."
When a defendant's contacts with the forum state suffice to
permit the court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction, but not in
personam jurisdiction over him, the due process clause will not
permit the court's judgment to affect more than the defendant's
interest in attached property." Due process requirements that
restrict a court's power to bind a defendant directly through an in
personam judgment similarly limit the court's power to bind the
defendant indirectly through the application of issue
preclusion." Thus, where a court cannot constitutionally exercise
in personam jurisdiction, precluding relitigation of issues deter-
mined in a quasi in rem action violates constitutional due
process.47
CONCLUSION
As long as courts exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction, the pre-
clusive effect of determinations made in such actions remains un-
certain. Some courts will treat any appearance by the defendant
in rem jurisdiction); Hall, Morse, Gallagher & Anderson v. Koch & Koch, 406 A.2d 962,
966 (N.H. 1979) (exercising quasi in rem jurisdiction pursuant to long-arm statute where
in personam jurisdiction lacking).
"4 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-99 (1980), the
Court held that the occurrence of an automobile mishap in Oklahoma did not alone pro-
vide a constitutional basis for in personam jurisdiction in Oklahoma over the New York
automobile dealer who had sold the plaintiff the car involved in the accident. The Court
emphasized that the requirement of "reasonableness" articulated in International Shoe lim-
ited, in accordance with constitutional due process restrictions, the availability of in perso-
nam jurisdiction over non-residents lacking in-state contacts. Such clarification of the
limitations on in personam jurisdiction refutes any assertion that the effective equivalent of
in personam jurisdiction should become available against defendants making limited
appearances, solely by the invocation of issue preclusion in a later suit.
11 One commentator has stated that "the propriety of exercising quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion in regard to tangibles may depend on limiting the effect of the resulting judgment to
the thing sued." Smit, supra note 35, at 620.
46 The Shaffer Court pointed out that "if a direct assertion of personal jurisdiction over
the defendant would violate the Constitution, it would seem that an indirect assertion of
that jurisdiction should be equally impermissible." 433 U.S. at 209.
4' This possibility concerned the Second Circuit in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d
106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). New York plaintiffs seeking damages
for injuries sustained in an auto accident attached nonresident defendant's interest in a
liability insurance policy issued by an insurance company doing business in New York. The
court, after observing that any recovery would necessarily be limited to the face value of
the policy even if defendant motorist defended on the merits, held that the exercise of
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to defend on the merits as a general appearance. Such courts
need not look to section 75(c) of the Restatement Second because
every contested action will be treated as in personam. Courts
that permit limited appearances, however, must decide whether a
defendant is precluded from relitigating in a subsequent action
issues that were litigated and determined in a limited appearance.
The application of issue preclusion to determinations made
in limited appearances cannot be justified on grounds of judicial
economy. Such application also contravenes fundamental notions
of fairness and constitutional due process. Defendants should be
entitled to rely on the promise of limited liability offered by the
limited appearance. Courts should not apply a rule that trans-
forms the promise into a sham.
Ernest L. Schmider
jurisdiction did not violate due process. The Second Circuit added, however, that "the
troubling issue is whether a state could deem [a decision granting recovery] effective as a
collateral estoppel." The court resolved the "troubling issue" by concluding "we cannot
fairly hold that New York has denied due process merely because of the possibility that some
other state may do so." 410 F.2d at 112 (emphasis added). See also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S.
320 (1980) (attachment of nonresident defendant's interest in liability insurance policy
issued by resident insurer held violative of due process); Clermont, supra note 40, at 459
n.231.
" See note 2 supra.
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